Demokrasi ve Yolsuzluğun Yeniden Dağıtıma Etkileri: Türkiye İçin Ampirik Bir Analiz

Öz

Demokrasi ve yolsuzluğun gelir eşitsizliğine etkisi çok sayıda ampirik çalışma tarafından incelenmişken, yeniden dağıtımı nasıl etkiledikleri ise sınırlı sayıda çalışma tarafından incelenmiştir. Literatürdeki bu boşluktan hareketle gerçekleştirilen bu çalışmanın amacı; Türkiye’de 2002-2023 yılları arasında demokrasi ve yolsuzluğun birlikte yeniden dağıtımı nasıl etkilediğini ortaya koymaktır. ARDL yöntemi, KPSS durağanlık testi ve PP birim kök testi ile ulaşılan bulgular şöyle sıralanabilir. i) Değişkenlerin durağanlık özellikleri ampirik modelin ARDL ile tahminine uygundur. ii) Bağımsız değişkenler bağımlı değişkeni uzun dönemde istikrarlı bir şekilde açıklayabilmektedir. iii) Demokrasi endeksindeki ve işsizlik oranlarındaki artış yeniden dağıtımı azaltmaktadır. iv) Yolsuzluğun azaldığı anlamına gelen yolsuzluk endeksindeki artış ise yeniden dağıtımın artmasına yol açmaktadır. Dolayısıyla yeniden dağıtımı arttırmak ve böylece gelir eşitsizliğini düşürmek için Türkiye’de yolsuzluk ile etkin bir mücadele başlatılmalıdır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Yeniden dağıtım
• Demokrasi
• Yolsuzluk
• ARDL

The Impacts of Democracy and Corruption on Redistribution: An Empirical Analysis for Türkiye

Öz

While numerous empirical studies have examined the effects of democracy and corruption on income inequality, few studies have examined how they affect redistribution. This study, which was carried out based on this gap in the literature, aims to reveal how democracy and corruption affected redistribution in Türkiye between 2002 and 2023. The findings obtained by the ARDL method, KPSS stationarity test, and PP unit root test are as follows: i) The variables' stationarity properties are suitable for estimating the empirical model with the ARDL. ii) A stable long-run relationship exists between the independent and dependent variables. iii) An increase in the democracy index and unemployment rates reduces redistribution. iv) An increase in the corruption index (indicating lower corruption), leads to increased redistribution. Therefore, an effective fight against corruption should be launched in Türkiye to increase redistribution and thus reduce income inequality.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Income redistribution
• Democracy
• Corruption
• ARDL

Kaynakça

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