A Study on Fiscal Illusion in Turkey

Öz

Studies examining the structure of the public sector have accelerated in the literature, especially since the 1960s, with the standpoint known as Public Choice Theory. Within the scope of Public Choice Theory, which examines public sector behaviors with economic tools, the fiscal illusion, which is one of the concepts that explains the failure of the government, deals with the growth of the public sector, especially focusing on the relationship between public expenditures and the tax system. The study, which includes the theoretical elements and the effect of the public sector on the decision-making processes in addition to the historical development, is empirically examined the fiscal illusion in Turkey within the scope of causality relations and differs from previous studies in the literature in this respect. The study, in which the expenditure and tax revenue data for the period 1960-2020 and the Granger causality test are used, original side of the study both in terms of the breadth of the period and the method. In the study, the fiscal illusion was examined through the causality relationship between public expenditures and tax revenues amounts for a wide period in Turkey, and in this respect, it was the first study in Turkey. According to the result of the Granger causality analysis, no causal relationship is detected between public expenditures and tax revenues. Therefore, no link is found between tax payments and public expenditures in Turkey in the mentioned periods.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Public Choice Theory
• Fiscal Illusion
• Granger Test

Türkiye’de Mali İllüzyon Üzerine Bir İnceleme

Öz

Kamu kesiminin yapısını inceleyen çalışmalar, literatürde özellikle 1960’lı yıllardan itibaren Kamu Tercihi Teorisi olarak bilinen düşünce yapısıyla birlikte hız kazanmıştır. Kamu kesimi davranışlarını ekonomik araçlarla inceleyen Kamu Tercihi Teorisi kapsamında, devletin başarısızlığını açıklayan kavramlardan biri olan mali illüzyon, özellikle kamu harcamaları ile vergi sistemi arasındaki ilişkiye odaklanarak, kamu kesiminin büyümesini konu edinmektedir. Tarihsel gelişiminin yanı sıra teorik unsurları ve kamu kesiminin karar alma süreçlerindeki etkisinin de yer verildiği çalışmada, Türkiye’de mali illüzyonun varlığı, nedensellik ilişkisi kapsamında ampirik olarak incelenmekte ve bu yönüyle literatürdeki önceki çalışmalardan ayrılmaktadır. 1960-2020 dönemine ait harcama ve vergi hasılatı verileri ve Granger nedensellik testinin kullanıldığı çalışmanın özgün yanını, dönemin genişliği ve kullanılan yöntem oluşturmaktadır. Çalışmada Türkiye özelinde ve geniş bir dönem için kamu harcamaları ile vergi geliri tutarları arasındaki nedensellik ilişkisi üzerinden mali illüzyonun incelendiği ve bu yönüyle Türkiye’deki ilk çalışma olduğu görülmektedir. Uygulanan Granger nedensellik analizinin sonucuna göre kamu harcamaları ve vergi gelirleri arasında herhangi bir nedensellik ilişkisi tespit edilmemiştir. Dolayısıyla Türkiye’de ilgili dönemlerde vergi ödemeleri ile kamu harcamaları arasında herhangi bir bağ bulunamamıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Kamu Tercihi Teorisi
• Mali İllüzyon
• Granger Testi

Kaynakça

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