The Constitutional Invisibility of Individual Freedom of Expression in the Face of Digital Platforms

Yıl 2026, Cilt: 21 Sayı: 1 , 229 - 274 , 27.04.2026

Aslıhan Kaplan Arık

https://doi.org/10.58820/eruhfd.1878783

https://izlik.org/JA28YU94UK

Öz

The factual effects of digital platforms on individuals’ freedom of expression and the reasons why these effects have not been rendered visible at the constitutional level in national and international law constitute the subject of this article. Although platforms have become the primary regulators of the digital public sphere and their practices of content removal and account suspension effectively determine the conditions under which individuals exercise their freedom of expression, such interventions do not, in most legal systems, constitute a direct subject of constitutional review. It is argued that freedom of expression in the digital sphere can no longer be understood solely through a binary relationship between the individual and the state; rather, it operates within a tripartite structure composed of the individual, the state, and digital platforms. In this context, it is maintained that the classical state-centered understanding of freedom of expression is insufficient to explain the structural power exercised by platforms over public discourse. Within this framework, an analysis is conducted through the concept of normative invisibility, examining the indirect effect model prevailing in United States law, European Union regulations, and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. By contrast, the jurisprudence of the German Federal Constitutional Court is addressed as an exceptional approach that recognizes the structural effects of digital platforms on public debate at the constitutional level. The aim is not to propose a normative solution, but rather to render visible the structural gap concerning the constitutional status of the individual vis-à-vis digital platforms in the digital sphere.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Freedom of Expression , Digital Platforms , Digital Public Sphere , Normative Invisibility , Constitutional Law , Indirect Effect (Drittwirkung).

Etik Beyan

The author has not declared any conflict of interest or shared interest.

Dijital Platformlar Karşısında Bireyin İfade Özgürlüğünün Anayasal Görünmezliği

https://izlik.org/JA28YU94UK

Öz

Dijital platformların bireylerin ifade özgürlüğü üzerindeki fiilî etkileri ve bu etkilerin ulusal ve uluslararası hukukta neden anayasal düzeyde görünür kılınamadığı, bu makalenin inceleme konusunu oluşturmaktadır. Dijital kamusal alanın başlıca düzenleyicileri hâline gelen platformların içerik kaldırma ve hesap askıya alma uygulamaları, bireyin ifade özgürlüğünün kullanım koşullarını fiilen belirlemesine rağmen, çoğu hukuk düzeninde bu müdahaleler doğrudan bir anayasal denetim konusu hâline gelmemektedir. Dijital alanda ifade özgürlüğünün artık yalnızca birey ile devlet arasındaki ikili ilişki üzerinden kavranamayacağı; birey, devlet ve dijital platformlardan oluşan üç aktörlü bir yapı içinde işlediği ileri sürülmektedir. Bu bağlamda, klasik devlet-merkezli ifade özgürlüğü anlayışının, platformların kamusal söylem üzerindeki yapısal gücünü açıklamakta yetersiz kaldığı savunulmaktadır. Bu çerçevede normatif görünmezlik kavramı üzerinden bir analiz yapılmakta; ABD hukuku, Avrupa Birliği düzenlemeleri ve Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi içtihadında hâkim olan dolaylı etki modeli incelenmektedir. Buna karşılık Alman Federal Anayasa Mahkemesi’nin içtihadı, dijital platformların kamusal tartışma üzerindeki yapısal etkilerini anayasal düzlemde tanıyan istisnai bir yaklaşım olarak ele alınmaktadır. Amaç, normatif bir çözüm önermekten ziyade, dijital alanda bireyin platformlar karşısındaki anayasal statüsüne ilişkin yapısal boşluğu görünür kılmaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

İfade Özgürlüğü; Dijital Platformlar , Dijital Kamusal Alan , Normatif Görünmezlik , Anayasa Hukuku , Dolaylı Etki (Drittwirkung)

Etik Beyan

Yazar tarafından herhangi bir çıkar çatışması veya ortak çıkar beyan edilmemiştir.

Destekleyen Kurum

Bulunmamaktadır.

Teşekkür

Bulunmamaktadır.

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