Analysis of Russian Hybrid Warfare Capacity in Crimean and Donbas Crises

Yıl 2021, , 203 - 246, 30.03.2021

Gökhan Cin Hasan Hüseyin Tekin

https://doi.org/10.17752/guvenlikstrtj.905960

Cited By: 4

Öz

This study analyses the Eastern Ukraine and the Crimean crises that resulted with de facto boundaries of Ukraine in 2014-2015, from the perspective of Hybrid warfare that implemented by the Russian Federation (Russia). In order to understand the historical aspect of the cases, the causes and historical roots of the difference between Western and Eastern Ukraine has been emphasized by referring the identity of Ukraine. In order to prevent a possible confusion, all the other related concepts which share the method base with hybrid warfare concept, has also been explained. The causes and conditions that generated the hybrid warfare capability which assumed to be possessed by Russia, who is the executor of the Crimea and Donbas cases, have explored. With that aim, the security structure and the security concept which evolved to hybrid warfare capability of the Russia who inherited an obsolete and bulky armed forces from USSR, has discussed in the progress. This study aims to define the Russian interpretation of hybrid warfare in Crimean and Donbas Crises and explore the way of implementation in the Ukrainian battlefield within the context of historical and conceptual aspect as a case study.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Hybrid Warfare, Asymmetric Warfare, Donbas, Crimea, Ukraine

Rusya’nın Hibrit Savaş Kapasitesinin Kırım ve Donbas Vakaları Üzerinden Analizi

Öz

Çalışma, hibrit savaş olgusunu, Rusya Federasyonu’nun (Bundan böyle bu makalede Rusya Federasyonu’ndan Rusya olarak bahsedilecektir), 2014-2015 yıllarında Doğu Ukrayna (Donbas) ve Kırım üzerinde gerçekleştirdiği harekât üzerinden analiz etmektedir. Seçilen coğrafi bölgenin ve vakaların tarihsel boyutunun anlaşılabilmesi için Ukrayna kimliğine değinilerek, Ukrayna’nın Doğusu ile Batısı arasındaki farklılıkların sebepleri ve tarihsel kökleri vurgulanmıştır. Literatürde birçok yazarın tanımladığı Hibrit savaş kavramının ne olduğu, tarihsel süreç içerisinde bugün nasıl algılandığı açıklanmaya çalışılmış, bu bağlamda kavram karmaşasının önüne geçebilmek için yöntem bakımından hibrit savaş ile ilintili diğer savaş kavramlarına da yer verilmiştir. Sovyet Sosyalist Cumhuriyetler Birliği’nden (SSCB) köhne ve hantal bir miras devralan Rusya’nın, yakın coğrafyasında gerçekleşen egemenlik krizlerini tecrübe ederek şekillendirdiği güvenlik mekanizması ile hibrit savaş kabiliyetine evrilen güvenlik konsepti bir süreç olarak ele alınmıştır. 2014-2015 Donbas ve Kırım olaylarını tarihsel ve kavramsal bir derinlikte vaka incelemesi olarak analiz eden bu çalışmanın amacı, Rusya’nın hibrit savaşı nasıl yorumladığını ve “özgün” Ukrayna harekât sahasında nasıl hayata geçirdiğini açıklamaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Hibrit Savaş, Asimetrik Savaş, Donbas, Kırım, Ukrayna

Kaynakça

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