Araştırma Makalesi
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Kantçı Düşüncenin Feminist Maledilişi Olanaklı mıdır?

Yıl 2022, Sayı: 1, 110 - 125, 30.04.2022

Öz

Kant’ın rasyonalite anlayışının temeline yerleştirdiği öznenin eril, batılı ve üst/orta sınıfa ait bir özne olduğu feminist kuramcılar tarafından Kant felsefesine yöneltilen temel suçlamalardan biridir. Aslında genel olarak ana akım Batı felsefesi ve özel olarak da Kant felsefesi için bu iddiayı destekleyecek çok sayıda kanıt vardır. Diğer yandan felsefe tarihi ile hesaplaşırken, felsefi kavram ve kategorilerden tam bir kopuşun mümkün olup olmadığı da ayrı bir tartışma konusudur. Bu makalede Kant felsefesini liberal feminizmin talepleriyle ve kapsayıcı bir demokratik katılım ilkesi ile uzlaştırabilecek çeşitli imkanlar üzerinde durmaya çalışıyorum. Özellikle otonomi ve kişilik kavramlarından yola çıkarak, Kant’ın eserlerindeki mizojinik söylemlerin göz ardı edilmesi yoluyla feminist taleplerle bağdaştırılabilecek yeni bir okuma yapmanın mümkün olup olmadığını tartışmaya açmak önemlidir. Günümüzde gelenekler, önyargılar, baskıcı yönetim biçimleri vb. pek çok unsur, kadınların özgür failler olarak ve otonom bir biçimde kamusal yaşamda yer almalarını, onların “hak statüsüne sahip özneler” olarak görülmelerini engellemektedir. Bu nedenle Kant’ın otonomi, kişi olma, özgür eylemlerde bulunma koşullarına sahip olma gibi kavramlarının feminist taleplerle ortak bir yanının olduğunu ileri sürüyorum.

Kaynakça

  • Antony, L. (1998) ‘‘‘Human Nature’’ and its Role in Feminist Theory’. In J. Kourany (ed.), Philosophy in a Feminist Voice, New Haven, CT: Princeton University Press, 63–91.
  • Bergès, S. (2013). The Routledge Guidebook to Wollstonecraft’s A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, New York: Routledge.
  • Carr, D. (1999). The Paradox of Subjectivity: The Self in The Transcendental Tradition, New York: Oxford University Press .
  • Eze, (1997). E. C. “The Color of Reason: The Idea of ‘Race in Kant’s Anthropology.” Postcolonial African Philosophy: A Critical Reader, Ed: C.E. Eze, 103-40. Oxford: Blackwell.
  • Hay, C. (2013). Kantianism, Liberalism and Feminism: Resisting Oppression, London: Palgrave Macmillian.
  • Kant, I. (1964). Critique of Pure Reason, (J. M. D. Meiklejohn, Trans.). London: Dent and Son Ltd.
  • Kant, I. (1989). On The Common Saying: This May Be True in Theory, But It Doesn’t Apply in Practice, Kant: Political Writings, (Raymond Geuss, Quentin Skinner, Ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Kant, I. (1991). The Metaphysics of Morals, (Mary Gregor, Trans.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Kant, I. (1997). Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. (Mary Gregor, Trans.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Kant, I. (1998). Critique of Pure Reason. (Translate: Paul Guyer, Allen Wood). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Kant, I. (2003). Observations of The Feeling of The Beautiful and Sublime, (John T. Goldthwait, Trans.). London: University of California Press.
  • Kant, I. (2006). Anthropology From A Pragmatic Point of View, (Robert Louden, Trans.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Kant, I. (2012). Natural Science, (Eric Watkins, Trans. and Ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Kleingeld, P. (2019). On Dealing with Kant’s Sexism and Racism, SGIR Review,2(2), 3-22. https://philpapers.org/rec/KLEODW.
  • Kleingeld, P. (1993). “The Problematic Status of Gender-Neutral Language in the History of Philosophy: The Case of Kant,” The Philosophical Forum XXV(2), pp. 134–150
  • Lloyd, G. (1984). The Man of Reason: ‘Male’ and ‘Female’ in Western Philosophy, University of Minneapolis: Minnesota Press.
  • Moore, A.W. (2002). “Quasi-realism and Relativism.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 65, No. 1 150-156.
  • Mendus, S. (1992). ‘Kant: ‘‘An Honest But Narrow-Minded Bourgeois’’? Essays on Kant’s Political Philosophy, H. Williams (ed.), Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 166–90.
  • Pateman, C. (1988). The Sexual Contract, Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press.
  • Plumwood, V. (1993). ‘The Politics of Reason: Towards a Feminist Logic’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 71, no. 4, pp. 436-462.
  • Piper, Adrian. (1997) “Xenophobia and Kantian Rationalism.” In Feminist Interpretations of Immanuel Kant, Ed: Robin May Schott, 21–73. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press
  • Rumsey, Jean. (1989). “The Development of Character in Kantian Moral Theory.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 27 (2): 247–265.
  • Rawls, J. (1999). A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition, USA: Harvard University Press.
  • Shott, R. M. (1997). Feminist Interpretations on Immanuel Kant, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press.
  • Varden, H. (2020). Sex, Love, and Gender: A Kantian Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Veltman, A., Piper M. (2014). Autonomy, Oppression and Gender, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Wollstonecraft, M. (1995). A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Wilson, D. (2004). “Kant and The Marriage Right”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly , 85: 103–123.

Would a Feminist Appropriation of the Kantian Thought be Possible?

Yıl 2022, Sayı: 1, 110 - 125, 30.04.2022

Öz

It is one of the main allegations impelled by feminist theorists against Kant's philosophy that the subject Kant placed at the base of his understanding of rationality is masculine, a Westerner and belongs to upper/middle class. In fact, there is considerable supporting evidence to promote this claim for mainstream Western philosophy in general and Kant's philosophy in particular. On the other hand, while reckoning with the history of philosophy, and examining whether it is possible to break away from philosophical concepts and categories or not, is another matter of discussion. In this article, I try to focus on various possibilities that can reconcile Kant's philosophy with the demands of liberal feminism and an inclusive democratic participation principle. It is important that to discuss whether it is possible to make a new reading that can be reconciled with feminist demands by ignoring the misogynistic discourses in Kant's works, especially starting from the concepts of autonomy and personality. Today, many factors like traditions, prejudices, oppressive forms of government, etc. prevent women from taking part in public life as free agents and autonomously, and from being considered as “subjects with the status of rights”. Therefore, I argue that Kant's concepts such as autonomy, becoming a person and having the conditions for free action, do have something in common with feminist demands.

Kaynakça

  • Antony, L. (1998) ‘‘‘Human Nature’’ and its Role in Feminist Theory’. In J. Kourany (ed.), Philosophy in a Feminist Voice, New Haven, CT: Princeton University Press, 63–91.
  • Bergès, S. (2013). The Routledge Guidebook to Wollstonecraft’s A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, New York: Routledge.
  • Carr, D. (1999). The Paradox of Subjectivity: The Self in The Transcendental Tradition, New York: Oxford University Press .
  • Eze, (1997). E. C. “The Color of Reason: The Idea of ‘Race in Kant’s Anthropology.” Postcolonial African Philosophy: A Critical Reader, Ed: C.E. Eze, 103-40. Oxford: Blackwell.
  • Hay, C. (2013). Kantianism, Liberalism and Feminism: Resisting Oppression, London: Palgrave Macmillian.
  • Kant, I. (1964). Critique of Pure Reason, (J. M. D. Meiklejohn, Trans.). London: Dent and Son Ltd.
  • Kant, I. (1989). On The Common Saying: This May Be True in Theory, But It Doesn’t Apply in Practice, Kant: Political Writings, (Raymond Geuss, Quentin Skinner, Ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Kant, I. (1991). The Metaphysics of Morals, (Mary Gregor, Trans.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Kant, I. (1997). Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. (Mary Gregor, Trans.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Kant, I. (1998). Critique of Pure Reason. (Translate: Paul Guyer, Allen Wood). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Kant, I. (2003). Observations of The Feeling of The Beautiful and Sublime, (John T. Goldthwait, Trans.). London: University of California Press.
  • Kant, I. (2006). Anthropology From A Pragmatic Point of View, (Robert Louden, Trans.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Kant, I. (2012). Natural Science, (Eric Watkins, Trans. and Ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Kleingeld, P. (2019). On Dealing with Kant’s Sexism and Racism, SGIR Review,2(2), 3-22. https://philpapers.org/rec/KLEODW.
  • Kleingeld, P. (1993). “The Problematic Status of Gender-Neutral Language in the History of Philosophy: The Case of Kant,” The Philosophical Forum XXV(2), pp. 134–150
  • Lloyd, G. (1984). The Man of Reason: ‘Male’ and ‘Female’ in Western Philosophy, University of Minneapolis: Minnesota Press.
  • Moore, A.W. (2002). “Quasi-realism and Relativism.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 65, No. 1 150-156.
  • Mendus, S. (1992). ‘Kant: ‘‘An Honest But Narrow-Minded Bourgeois’’? Essays on Kant’s Political Philosophy, H. Williams (ed.), Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 166–90.
  • Pateman, C. (1988). The Sexual Contract, Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press.
  • Plumwood, V. (1993). ‘The Politics of Reason: Towards a Feminist Logic’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 71, no. 4, pp. 436-462.
  • Piper, Adrian. (1997) “Xenophobia and Kantian Rationalism.” In Feminist Interpretations of Immanuel Kant, Ed: Robin May Schott, 21–73. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press
  • Rumsey, Jean. (1989). “The Development of Character in Kantian Moral Theory.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 27 (2): 247–265.
  • Rawls, J. (1999). A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition, USA: Harvard University Press.
  • Shott, R. M. (1997). Feminist Interpretations on Immanuel Kant, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press.
  • Varden, H. (2020). Sex, Love, and Gender: A Kantian Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Veltman, A., Piper M. (2014). Autonomy, Oppression and Gender, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Wollstonecraft, M. (1995). A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Wilson, D. (2004). “Kant and The Marriage Right”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly , 85: 103–123.
Toplam 28 adet kaynakça vardır.

Ayrıntılar

Birincil Dil İngilizce
Bölüm Makaleler
Yazarlar

Özlem Duva Kaya 0000-0001-7941-3198

Yayımlanma Tarihi 30 Nisan 2022
Yayımlandığı Sayı Yıl 2022 Sayı: 1

Kaynak Göster

APA Duva Kaya, Ö. (2022). Would a Feminist Appropriation of the Kantian Thought be Possible?. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi, 1(1), 110-125.
AMA Duva Kaya Ö. Would a Feminist Appropriation of the Kantian Thought be Possible?. KFD. Nisan 2022;1(1):110-125.
Chicago Duva Kaya, Özlem. “Would a Feminist Appropriation of the Kantian Thought Be Possible?”. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi 1, sy. 1 (Nisan 2022): 110-25.
EndNote Duva Kaya Ö (01 Nisan 2022) Would a Feminist Appropriation of the Kantian Thought be Possible?. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi 1 1 110–125.
IEEE Ö. Duva Kaya, “Would a Feminist Appropriation of the Kantian Thought be Possible?”, KFD, c. 1, sy. 1, ss. 110–125, 2022.
ISNAD Duva Kaya, Özlem. “Would a Feminist Appropriation of the Kantian Thought Be Possible?”. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi 1/1 (Nisan 2022), 110-125.
JAMA Duva Kaya Ö. Would a Feminist Appropriation of the Kantian Thought be Possible?. KFD. 2022;1:110–125.
MLA Duva Kaya, Özlem. “Would a Feminist Appropriation of the Kantian Thought Be Possible?”. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi, c. 1, sy. 1, 2022, ss. 110-25.
Vancouver Duva Kaya Ö. Would a Feminist Appropriation of the Kantian Thought be Possible?. KFD. 2022;1(1):110-25.