Deneyimsel Şeffaflığın Türleri

Yıl 2019, Cilt: 2 Sayı: 1, 1 - 31, 30.06.2019

Erhan Demircioglu

Öz

Öz: Özel
olarak “deneyimin şeffaflığı”, genel olarak ise “içgörü” üzerine
değerlendirmeler çağdaş zihin felsefesinde merkezi bir role sahiptir. Buna
karşın, bana öyle geliyor ki, deneyimin şeffaflığı ve içgörü üzerine düşünceler
tam bir netliğe kavuşmuş olmaktan uzaktır: farklı şeffaflık iddiaları
arasındaki ayrımlar yeterince fark edilmemiş ve içgörünün kendi başına neyi
destekleyip desteklemediği açıklıkla aydınlığa kavuşturulmamış durumdadır. Bu
makalenin temel amacı, farklı şeffaflık iddiaları arasındaki zengin çeşitliliği
ortaya serip tartışmaya kavramsal netlik kazandırmaktır. Makale üç temel
bölümden oluşmaktadır. Birinci bölüm, Moore’un içgörü ve deneyimin şeffaflığı
üzerine görüşlerini tartışmaktadır. Genel kanının aksine, Moore’un deneyimin
şeffaf olmadığını göstermeye çalıştığını iddia edeceğim. İkinci bölüm,
Harman’ın şeffaflık tezinin fenomenist şeffaflık tezinden farklarına işaret
etmektedir. Üçüncü bölüm ise, Harman’ın şeffaflık tezinin iki ayrı versiyonu
olan “deneyimsel-eylem şeffaflığı” ve “zihinsel-tasvir şeffaflığı” arasında
ayrım yapmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

deneyimin şeffaflığı, içgörü, deneyimin eylem-nesne modeli, temsilcilik, George Edward Moore, Gilbert Harman

Varieties of Experiential Transparency

Öz

Abstract: Considerations on the transparency of experience
in particular, and introspection in general, play a central role in the
contemporary philosophy of mind. However, despite various attempts to rectify
matters, it seems to me that appeals to transparency and introspection are
sometimes mired in confusion: neither there is an explicit and general
recognition of the fact that different transparency claims are often treated as
one and the same, nor is there sufficiently robust clarity in what
introspection itself can support. The central aim of this paper is to achieve
some conceptual clarity by bringing to the surface for examination the rich
variety of different experiential transparency claims that are left implicit in
the literature. The paper falls into three main sections. Section 2 discusses
Moore’s views on introspection and the transparency of experience. Contra
common opinion, I argue inter alia
that Moore is concerned with showing that experience is not transparent (in a sense to be specified). Section 3 introduces
“Harmanian transparency”, as it arises in the context of the debate between
representationism and phenomenism, and distinguishes it from “phenomenist
transparency.” Section 4 distinguishes two varieties of Harmanian transparency,
i.e. “experiencing-act transparency” and “mental-paint transparency.”

Anahtar Kelimeler

transparency of experience, introspection, act-object model of experience, representationism, George Edward Moore, Gilbert Harman

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