The Robot Rights Dilemma in Ian McEwan’s Machines Like Me

Öz

The concept of ‘robot rights’ has become a current topic of discussion due to the increasingly complex functions of artificial intelligence and robots, as well as the human-robot interactions. As robots acquire human-like capabilities, the question of whether they can or should have rights is frequently raised by researchers from different disciplines. Literature, while providing a fictional framework for exploring the issue of robot rights also serves as an interdisciplinary tool that shapes these debates in line with societal expectations and attitudes. This study aims to offer a fresh perspective on the debate on robot rights by using the possibilities offered by literature to examine a concrete example and analyze human-robot interaction within the framework of these rights. In this context, Ian McEwan’s novel Machines Like Me, which explores the complex relationships between humans and androids with artificial intelligence, is analyzed through the four basic frameworks presented in David J. Gunkel’s Robot Rights (Robots cannot/should not have rights, robots can/should have rights, although robots can/should not have rights, even if robots cannot/should have rights). By addressing the moral dilemmas arising from human-robot relations, the study shows that the debate over robot rights is not just a theoretical issue but could have practical consequences that could shape the future of humanity. It also shows that the integration of robots into society could lead to significant social and moral changes and that literature has an important role to play in understanding these changes. In this way, a literary perspective is added to the debate on the rights of robots.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Machines Like Me
• David J. Gunkel
• Ian McEwan
• robot rights
• artificial intelligence

Ian McEwan’ın Benim Gibi Makineler Romanında Robot Hakları İkilemi

Öz

‘Robot hakları’ kavramı, yapay zekâ ve robotların karmaşık hale gelen işlevleri ve insan-robot etkileşimleri nedeniyle güncel bir tartışma konusu haline gelmiştir. Robotların insanlara benzeyen yetenekler kazanmasıyla birlikte, hakları olup olamayacağı sorusu farklı disiplinlerden araştırmacılar tarafından sıkça gündeme getirilmektedir. Edebiyat da robot hakları konusunu kurgusal bir zemin üzerinden sorgulamaya olanak tanırken, toplumsal beklentiler ve tutumlar ışığında bu tartışmaları şekillendiren disiplinlerarası bir araç işlevi görmektedir. Bu çalışma, edebiyatın sunduğu olanaklarla, somut bir örnek üzerinden robot hakları tartışmalarına yeni bir bakış açısı kazandırmayı ve insan-robot etkileşimini bu haklar çerçevesinde incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu bağlamda, Ian McEwan’ın yapay zekâya sahip androidlerle insanlar arasındaki karmaşık ilişkileri ele alan Benim Gibi Makineler (Machines Like Me) adlı romanı, David J. Gunkel’ın Robot Hakları kitabındaki dört temel başlık (Robotların hakları olamaz/olmamalıdır, olsa da/olmamalıdır, olabilir/olmalıdır, olamasa da/olmalıdır) çerçevesinde incelenmiştir. Böylelikle, insanların robotlarla olan ilişkilerinin doğurduğu ahlaki ikilemleri ele alarak, robot hakları tartışmasının yalnızca teorik bir mesele olmadığını ve insanlığın geleceğini şekillendirecek pratik sonuçlar doğurabileceğini göstermektedir. Ayrıca, robotların topluma entegrasyonunun sosyal ve ahlaki bağlamda önemli dönüşümler yaratabileceğini ve edebiyatın bu dönüşümün anlaşılmasında önemli bir rol oynadığını ortaya koymaktadır. Böylece, robot haklarına ilişkin tartışmalara edebi bir bakış açısı eklenmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Benim Gibi Makineler
• David J. Gunkel
• Ian McEwan
• robot hakları
• yapay zeka

Kaynakça

1. Adams, T. (2019, April 14). Ian McEwan: ‘Who’s going to write the algorithm for the little white lie?’. 2024 tarihinde The Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/books/2019/apr/14/ian-mcewan-interview-machines-like-me-artificial-intelligence adresinden alındı
2. Asaro, P. (2006). What should we want from a robot ethic? International Review of Information Ethics, 6(12), 9-16. doi:https://doi.org/10.29173/irie134
3. Ashrafian, H. (2015). Artificial Intelligence and Robot Responsibilities:. Science and Engineering Ethics, 21(2), 317-326. doi:10.1007/s11948-014-9541-0
4. Bentham, J. (1948). A fragment on government and An introduction to the principles of morals and legislation (W. Harrison, Ed.). Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
5. Boden, M., Bryson, J., Caldwell, D., Dautenhahn, K., Edwards, L., Kember, S., . . . Winfield, A. (2017). Principles of robotics: Regulating robots in the real world. Connection Science, 29(2), 124-129. doi:10.1080/09540091.2016.1271400
6. Bostrom, N. (2014). Introduction—The transhumanist FAQ: A general introduction. In C. T. Peterson (Ed.), Transhumanism and the body: The world religions speak (s. 1–17). Palgrave Macmillan.
7. Brooks, R. A. (2003). Flesh and Machines: How Robots Will Change Us. New York: Vintage Books.
8. Bryson, J. J. (2010). Robots Should Be Slaves. Y. Wilks (Dü.) içinde, Close Engagements with Artificial Companions: Key social, psychological, ethical and design issues. (s. 63-74). Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

9. Bryson, J. J. (2018). Patiency is not a virtue: the design of intelligent systems and systems. Ethics and Information Technology, 20, 15-26. doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-018-9448-6
10. Bryson, J. J., Diamantis, M. E., & Grant, T. D. (2017). Of, for, and by the people: the legal lacuna of synthetic persons. Artif Intell Law, 25(3), 273-291. doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/s10506-017-9214-9
11. Channell, D. F. (1991). The Vital Machine: A Study of Technology and Organic Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
12. Darling, K. (2016). Extending legal protection to social robots: The effects of anthropomorphism, empathy, and violent behavior toward robotic objects. R. Calo, A. M. Froomkin, & I. Kerr (Dü) içinde, Robot Law (s. 213–231). Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing. doi:https://doi.org/10.4337/9781783476732.00017
13. Darling, K. (2017). “Who’s Johnny?” Anthropomorphic framing in human-robot interaction, integration, and policy. P. Lin, R. Jenkins, & K. Abney (Dü) içinde, Robot Ethics 2.0: From Autonomous Cars to Artificial Intelligence (s. 173–191). New York: Oxford University Press.
14. Dennett, D. C. (1998). Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology. Cambridge: MIT Press.
15. Feenberg, A. C. (1991). Critical Theory of Technology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
16. Ferrari, R. (2022). A Plunge into Otherness: Ethics and Literature in Machines Like Me by Ian McEwan. Between, 12(24), 247-271. doi:https://doi.org/10.13125/2039-6597/5166
17. Fukuyama, F. (2004). Transhumanism. Foreign Policy, 144, 42–43. https://doi.org/10.2307/4152980
18. Goertzel, B. (2002, May). Thoughts on AI Morality. Dynamical Psychology: An International, Interdisciplinary Journal of: https://www.goertzel.org/dynapsyc/2002/AIMorality.htm adresinden alındı
19. Gunkel, D. J. (2018). Robot Rights. Cambridge: MA: MIT Press.
20. Hall, J. S. (2011, Temmuz 5). Beyond AI: Creating the Conscience of the Machine. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books. KurzweilAI. net. adresinden alındı
21. Haraway, D. J. (2008). When Species Meet. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
22. Heidegger, M. (1977). The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays. (W. Lovitt, Çev.) New York: Harper & Row.
23. Johnson, D. G. (2006). Computer systems: Moral entities but not moral agents. Ethics and Information Technology, 8, 195-204. doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-006-9111-5
24. Klein, W. E. (2016). Robots make ethics honest: And vice versa. Acm Sigcas Computers and Society, 45(3), 261-269. doi:https://doi.org/10.1145/2874239.2874276
25. Kopka, K., & Schaffeld, N. (2020). Turing’s Missing Algorithm: The Brave New World of Ian McEwan’s Android Novel Machines Like Me. Journal of Literature and Science, 13(2), 52-74.
26. Kramer, M. H. (1998). A debate over rights: Philosophical enquiries (N. E. Simmonds & H. Steiner, Eds.). Clarendon Press.
27. Księżopolska, I. (2022). Can Androids Write Science Fiction? Ian McEwan’s Machines like Me. Critique: Studies in Contemporary Fiction, 63(4), 414-429. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/00111619.2020.1851165
28. Kurzweil, R. (2005). The Singularity Is Near: When Humans Transcend Biology. New York: Viking Penguin.
29. Levy, D. (2005). Robots Unlimited: Life in a Virtual Age. Boca Raton: CRC Press.
30. Levy, D. (2009). The ethical treatment of artificially conscious robots. International Journal of Social Robotics, 1, 209–216. doi:10.1007/s12369-009-0022-6
31. Marx, J., & Tiefensee, C. (2015). Of animals, robots and men. Historical Social Research, 40(4), 70–91. doi:10.12759/hsr.40.2015.4.70-91
32. McCarthy, J. (1995). Making Robots Conscious of Their Mental States. K. Furukawa, D. Michie, & S. H. Muggleton (Dü.), Machine Intelligence 15 içinde (s. 3-17). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
33. McEwan, I. (2019, April 19). Ian McEwan on Rewriting the Past: ‘It’s Not Quite a Dystopia, It’s Something Slightly Better than Reality'. Penguin Official: https://www.penguin.co.uk/articles/2019/04/ian-mcewan-machines-like-me-interview adresinden alındı
34. McEwan, I. (2019). Machines Like Me. London: Jonathan Cape.
35. McEwan, I. (2024). Benim Gibi Makineler (5 b.). (İ. Özdemir, Çev.) İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları.
36. Miller, L. F. (2015). Granting automata human rights: Challenge to a basis of full-rights privilege. Human Rights Review, 16(4), 369-391. doi:doi:10.1007/s12142-015-0387-x
37. Neely, E. L. (2014). Machines and the Moral Community. Philosophy & Technology, 27, 97–111. doi:10.1007/s13347-013-0114-y
38. Neuhäuser, C. (2015). Some skeptical remarks regarding robot responsibility and a way forward. C. Misselhorn (Dü.) içinde, Collective Agency and Cooperation in Natural and Artificial Systems: Explanation, Implementation, and Simulation (s. 131-148). New York: Springer.
39. O'Regan, J. K. (2007). How to Build Consciousness into a Robot: The. M. Lungarella, F. Iida, J. Bongard, & R. Pfeifer (Dü) içinde, 50 Years of Artificial (s. 332–346). Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
40. Raz, J. (1986). The morality of freedom. Oxford University Press.
41. Saleem, R. (2019, April 20). Machines like me by Ian McEwan review: A baggy and jumbled narrative. The Irish Times: https://www.irishtimes.com/culture/books/machines-like-me-by-ian-mcewan-review-a-baggy-and-jumbled-narrative-1.3849775 adresinden alındı
42. Santosuosso, A. (2016). The human rights of nonhuman artificial entities: an oxymoron? Jahrbuch für Wissenschaft und Ethik, 19(1), 203–238. doi:10.1515/jwiet-2015-0114.
43. Schwitzgebel, E., & Garza, M. (2015). A defense of the rights of artificial intelligences. Midwest Studies In Philosophy, 39(1), 89-119. doi:0.1111/misp.12032.
44. Shang, B. (2020). From Alan Turing to Ian Mcewan: Artificial Intelligence, Lies and Ethics in Machines Like Me. Comparative Literature Studies, 57(3), 443-453. doi:10.5325/complitstudies.57.3.0443
45. Sparrow, R. (2004). The turing triage test. Ethics and, 6(4), 203–213. doi:10.1007/s10676-004-6491-2.
46. Sudia, F. W. (2001). A Jurisprudence of Artilects: A Blueprint for a Synthetic Citizen. Journal of Future Studies, 6(2), 65-80.
47. Torrance, S. (2003). Could we, should we, create conscious robots? Journal of Health, Social and Environmental Issues, 4(2), 43-46.
48. Velmans, M. (2009). Understanding Consciousness (Second Edition b.). New York: Routledge.
49. Vladeck, D. J. (2014). Machines without principals: liability rules and artificial intelligence. Washington Law Review, 89, 117-150.
50. Wallach, W., & Allen, C. (2009). Moral Machines: Teaching Robots Right from Wrong. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
51. Warrick, K. (2012). Robots with biological brains. P. Lin, K. Abney, & G. A. Bekey (Dü) içinde, Robot Ethics: The Ethical and Social Implications of Robotics (s. 317–332). Cambridge: MA: MIT Press.
52. Whitby, B. (2008). Sometimes it’s hard to be a robot: A call for action on the ethics of abusing artificial agents. Interacting with Computers, 20(3), 326-333. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intcom.2008.02.002
53. Yampolskiy, R. V. (2013). Artificial Intelligence Safety Engineering: Why Machine Ethics Is a Wrong Approach. V. C. Müller (Dü.) içinde, Philosophy and Theory of Artificial Intelligence. Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics (s. 389-296). Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag.
54. Yampolskiy, R. V. (2016). Artificial superintelligence: a futuristic approach. New York: CRC Press.